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CONFINED TO A NARRATIVE: APPROACHING 
RAPE SHIELD LAWS THROUGH LEGAL 
NARRATOLOGY 
KATHRYN C. SWISS

 
 
INTRODUCTION 
The law is immersed in narrative. This is particularly true within the 
space of trials, where participants share in the forming of narratives that 
are then judged by juries.
1
 Yet the jury functions in a way no audience of 
literature ever could: the jury determines what is and is not the “true” 
narration of events.
2
 Juries determine believability, and in doing so, 
inevitably privilege one narrative over another. In this way, legal 
narratives are distinguishable from literary fictions because the law 
presents itself as a self-enclosed system where truth (or at least truth 
beyond a reasonable doubt) is obtainable.
3
 Rather than acting as an 
audience that suspends disbelief in order to submerge the mind in a 
fictitious realm, the purpose of the jury is to judge analytically which 
presented combination of facts comprises the “true” narrative of the events 
being adjudicated.  
 
 
  Chief Executive Articles Editor, Washington University Jurisprudence Review; J.D. (2014), 
Washington University School of Law. 
 1. See W. LANCE BENNETT & MARTHA S. FELDMAN, RECONSTRUCTING REALITY IN THE 
COURTROOM: JUSTICE AND JUDGMENT IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1981) (introducing the notion that the 
criminal trial is organized around storytelling); see also J. Christopher Rideout, Storytelling, Narrative 
Rationality, and Legal Persuasion, 14 J. LEGAL WRITING INST. 53, 58 (2008) (describing narratives as 
“innate” to our “understanding and structuring of human experience,” and therefore persuasive and 
integral to the trial setting). 
 2. This is not to say that juries determine any sort of absolute “Truth” of events. Rather, it is to 
emphasize that the law requires that juries meet an extremely high threshold of human certainty when 
adjudging a trial. In a criminal trial, the burden of proof imposed on the prosecutor is to persuade the 
factfinder “beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime . . . charged.” In 
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). Jurors are required to “reach a ‘subjective state of near 
certitude’” of guilt. McCullough v. State, 657 P.2d 1157, 1158 (Nev. 1983) (per curiam) (quoting 
Jackson v. Virgina, 443 U.S. 307, 315 (1979)). The burden implied by the reasonable doubt standard is 
“the highest burden recognized in the law.” JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 76 
(5th ed., 2009). 
 3. Much philosophical debate exists over whether the law is, or could ever be, completely “self-
enclosed.” Yet I argue that the law endeavors to control its own language and construct rules that 
determine specific outcomes because it builds a lexicon of terms and then structures the narrative 
capacity for story-telling through rules of evidence and procedure. Similarly, the law may not purport 
to find the absolute “Truth” outside a legal realm, but it does claim to establish truth—beyond a 
reasonable doubt—within its own framework. 
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Yet while the structure and purpose of the legal system necessarily 
separate law from what most would deem “literature,” the law is 
inherently literary. As Robert Cover noted in the seminal essay Nomos and 
Narrative, “no set of legal institutions or prescriptions exists apart from 
the narratives that locate it and give it meaning.”4 Law’s meaning is tied to 
the narratives that convey it. Since the entire framework of the law, from 
the codification of laws to the medium of judicial opinions and everything 
in between, comingles with literature and specifically with narrative, those 
who study the judicial process should not undervalue the capabilities of 
narrative. 
Narratology, the field of study that analyzes the structure of narratives, 
understands narratives as inherently comprised of a finite set of linguistic 
formulations.
5
 Because narratives are finite, all details within a story are 
significant to the audience’s perception of events.6  At its core, narratology 
is concerned with the way in which specific structural elements of a story 
are utilized and ordered to construct meaning. How the structure of story-
telling shapes a person’s epistemological understanding of events is an 
important legal question because the judicial process hinges on the 
adjudication of narratives. To elucidate the power of narrative, this paper 
will consider the ways in which rape shield laws “shape” the narrative 
space, and thus the narrative capacity, of rape victims. 
Initially, rape shield laws were enacted
7
 by the federal government and 
individual states with the intent of protecting any rape victim from having 
her
8
 testimony scrutinized and her credibility as a witness called into 
 
 
 4. Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4 (1983) (footnote omitted).  
 5. Peter Brooks, Narrative Transactions—Does the Law Need a Narratology?, 18 YALE J.L. & 
HUMAN. 1, 2 (2006). 
 6.  In trials, given the rules of evidence, there is an implicit understanding that all the 
information being introduced is relevant to the story being narrated. Like the famous example of 
Chekhov’s gun, “[I]f in the first chapter you say that a gun hung on the wall, in the second or third 
chapter it must without fail be discharged,” all evidence introduced in trials is relevant to the events 
being narrated and adjudicated. See Alan M. Dershowitz, Life Is Not a Dramatic Narrative, in Law’s 
Stories: Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law (Peter Brooks & Paul Gerwitz eds., 1996) citing to ANTON 
TCHEKHOV: LITERARY AND THEATRICAL REMINISCENCES 23 (S.S. Kotelianksy ed. & trans., 1974).  
 7. For a history of rape shield laws in the United States from the late 1970s into the 1980s see 
Thomas Mitchell, We’re Only Fooling Ourselves: A Critical Analysis of the Biases Inherent in the 
Legal System’s Treatment of Rape Victims, 18 BUFF. J. GENDER, L. & SOC. POL’Y 73 (2009). 
 8. While recognizing that rape is not a specifically gendered crime, this paper will only consider 
how rape shield laws confine women to certain narratives by constraining them to characterizations 
that conform to the notion that only some types of women are truly “rapeable.” This paper will only 
deal with the way the law confines female rape victims’ access to justice. 
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question based on her past sexual history.
9
 The purpose underlying the 
creation of these laws was to counter the historically entrenched societal 
belief that (female) chastity correlated with female veracity.
10
 For 
example, in an 1895 opinion, the Missouri Supreme Court claimed that it 
was a matter of “common knowledge” that a woman’s capacity for 
truthfulness (but not a man’s capacity for truthfulness) was inherently 
linked to chastity: 
It is a matter of common knowledge that the bad character of a man 
for chastity does not even in the remotest degree affect his character 
for truth, when based upon that alone, while it does that of a 
woman. It is no compliment to a woman to measure her character 
for truth by the same standard that you do that of a man’s predicated 
upon character for chastity. What destroys the standing of the one in 
all the walks of life has no effect whatever on the standing for the 
truth of the other.
11
 
Rape shield laws sought to correct the ingrained association between a 
women’s credibility and her chastity by shielding a victim from inquiries 
into her sexual history when she took the witness stand. 
Prior to the enactment of rape shield laws, victims of sexual crimes 
consistently had their credibility impeached through evidence of prior 
sexual conduct.
12
  The Federal Rules of Evidence indicate that “[a]ny 
party, including the party that called the witness, may attack the witness’s 
credibility,”13 As such, a defendant in a rape case would often challenge 
the credibility of the victim’s testimony at trial in cross-examination via 
the insinuation that because of her previous sexual activity, the victim was 
lying in her assertions of rape.
14
 Reacting to this prevalent impeachment 
tactic, feminist activists, legislatures, and lawyers alike pushed for the 
enactment of rape shield laws in order to “shield” a woman’s sexual 
history from being considered relevant to her credibility in a rape trial. By 
the early 1980s almost every jurisdiction in the United States had enacted 
these laws.
15
 
 
 
 9. See Michelle J. Anderson, From Chastity Requirement to Sexuality License: Sexual Consent 
and a New Rape Shield Law, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 51 (2002) [hereinafter Anderson, Sexual 
Consent]. 
 10. See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Judging Sex, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1461 (2012). 
 11. State v. Sibley, 33 S.W. 167, 171 (Mo. 1895). 
 12. Anderson, Sexual Consent, supra note 9, at 69.  
 13. Fed. R. Evid. 607 
 14. Anderson, Sexual Consent, supra note 9, at 69. 
 15. Shawn Wallach, Rape Shield Laws: Protecting the Victim at the Expense of the Defendant’s 
Constitutional Rights, 13 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 485, 488 (1997). 
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My argument is that while these laws served a much-needed function 
in the evolution of rape law, the time has come to abandon rape shield 
laws and adopt a separate framework altogether. Rape shield laws 
contribute to society’s stereotyping of rape into a single story—a story that 
reifies “racist and sexist mythology” and ignores the much more pervasive 
narrative of acquaintance rape.
16
 In shielding past sexual experiences from 
the view of the courtroom, the law essentially denies that such experiences 
exist, rather than enforcing the notion that such an inquiry is simply not 
relevant to the events being adjudicated.
17
 These laws are harmful to most 
victims of rape
18
 because rape shield laws reify a framework that ignores 
the narrative of consent. The question presented in trial is hence turned 
away from a factual inquiry into the incident and instead towards the 
stereotyping of a victim’s narrative into two characterizations: a narrative 
about a victim or a narrative about a woman that, by virtue of her sexual 
experiences, lacks the credibility to claim rape.
19
  
 
 
 16. Michelle J. Anderson, Diminishing the Legal Impact of Negative Social Attitudes Toward 
Acquintance Rape Victims, 13 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 644, 645 (2010) [hereinafter Anderson, Negative 
Social Attitudes]. 
 17. Whether this is intentional is not an important inquiry. I do not argue that the rape shield laws 
were ever intended to imply that only chaste women have protection from the law. Yet I do think that 
such is their effect, and that therefore an analysis of the way in which they shape and value certain 
narratives is an important inquiry into whether they indeed serve the purposes of justice. 
 18. Additionally, another area in which narratology could be an avenue of study is the 
intersection between psychology and narrative in rape survivors. For a consideration of persons who 
survive abusive encounters and how in turn have their “sexual script” is shaped by those encounters, 
see Michelle Oberman, Regulating Consensual Sex with Minors: Defining a Role for Statutory Rape, 
48 BUFF. L. REV. 703 (2000). Oberman notes that “abusive encounters may develop [into] a ‘sexual 
script’” wherein the victim may come to “model future sexual interactions based on their early, 
exploitative experiences.” Id. at 730 (citation omitted). The author notes that this modeling affects the 
victim, who “may come to eroticize the power differentials inherent in the exploitative relationship she 
survived.” Id. Oberman’s argument here relies on the study conducted by Diana Russell that found that 
amongst a study group of women who had survived child sexual abuse, “between 38% and 48% of the 
survivors . . . had physically abusive husbands, compared with 17% of women who were not child 
sexual abuse victims.” Id. (citation omitted). The research also indicated that: 
[A] startlingly high percentage of adult female prostitutes are survivors of childhood sexual 
abuse. One study of 136 prostitutes found that 55% had their first sexual encounter as 
children, with someone ten or more years their senior. Sixty-five percent of these women 
reported having been forced into sexual activity before age sixteen.  
Inherent in the foregoing data is the problem of revictimization. Survivors of early and 
exploitative sexual relations are at increased risk for further abuse as they move through 
adolescence and into adulthood. 
Id. (citations omitted). See also DIANA E. H. RUSSELL, THE SECRET TRAUMA: INCEST IN THE LIVES OF 
GIRLS AND WOMEN (1999).  
 19. This argument is predicated on the belief that the law not only reflects but also influences the 
stereotypes that are prevalent in social thought. See Catharine A. MacKinnon, Law’s Stories as Reality 
and Politics, in LAW’S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 232, 235 (Peter Brooks & 
Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996) (recognizing that “[s]tories break stereotypes, but stereotypes are also 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol6/iss2/6
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In order to argue that rape shield laws reinforce stereotypical 
characterizations of women and confine women to certain narratives so 
that those narratives may be believed by their audience, this paper first 
examines what narratology is and how narratology can be a useful lens 
through which to analyze the law. The second section then turns to the 
history of rape shield laws and the theoretical justifications for their 
implementation. In this section I will also consider what rape shield laws 
do not cover—namely sexual history between the victim and the accused 
in any case of acquaintance rape. The third section offers a narrative 
analysis of how rape shield laws limit women to narrate an archetypal 
“story” in order to be believed in a courtroom. The fourth section will 
consider how the biases of juries, who act as the “audience,” shape the 
narrative of rape trials. In the final section I contend that the law needs to 
recognize that rape shield laws reinforce the traditional rape narrative. In 
turn, rape shield laws should give way to a legal definition of rape that is 
centered on the isolated event of consent. This recentering would draw 
character stereotypes and traditional narratives out of the rape framework, 
and open a space for the law to finally grapple with the idea that rape is 
not confined to an archetypal narrative. 
I. NARRATOLOGY 
A. What is Narratology? 
A key figure in the field of narratology is the French literary scholar 
Roland Barthes.
20
 Barthes, drawing from a variety of literary, sociological, 
and philosophical movements, introduced narratology as a theoretical 
approach to studying how literature imparts meaning. Barthes contended 
that the foundation for the underlying questions narratology seeks to 
address was formed by “the Russian formalists, Propp, and Levi-Strauss” 
who identified “the following dilemma: either narrative is a random 
assemblage of events, in which case one can only speak of it in terms of 
the narrator’s (the author’s) art, talent, or genius—all mythical 
embodiments of chance; or else it shares with other narratives a common 
 
 
stories”) [hereinafter MacKinnon, Law’s Stories as Reality]. If the law can emerge from its current 
stereotypical understanding of rape and recognize that other narratives define rape, then such a shift 
could lead to change in social thought as well. 
 20. For a summary of Roland Barthes’ literary theories and the subsequent influence of his body 
of work, see the introduction by Susan Sontag, Writing Itself: On Roland Barthes, in A BARTHES 
READER vii (Susan Sontag ed., 1982). 
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structure open to analysis . . . .”21 Rather than a random collage of 
linguistic patterns and events, Barthes concluded that narrative is an 
incredibly structured and complex system. Barthes recognized that this 
system is fundamentally necessary to any author’s creation of narrative 
and that “no one can produce a narrative without referring himself to an 
implicit system of units and rules.”22  
At the base of an understanding of narratology is the principle that 
narrative is a means by which we both collectively as a society, and 
independently as individuals, construct reality.
23
 If we understand 
narratology to be derived from the endeavors of structuralism, we can see 
that the project of narratology seeks to extend structuralism’s aim of 
searching for the implicit system of rules and components within a 
sentence to finding those same rules beyond that sentence. Thus those that 
engage with narratology attempt to analyze the structure of the different 
linguistic forms that underlie a narrative text as a whole.
24
 The intent is 
that by isolating certain narrative functions, we may be able to understand 
how those functions affect interpretation and the conveyance of meaning. 
In this way, narratology seeks to better understand how meaning is both 
imparted by the text and constructed by the reader via the vehicle that is 
narrative.  
Narratology thus takes the project of structuralism and applies it on a 
larger scale to the study of an entire narrative account.
25
 The structuralist 
influence on narratology is reflected in Peter Brooks’ definition of the 
project of narratology as an analysis of the 
minimal units of narrative and how they combine in a plot; to how 
we understand the initiation and completion of an action; to 
standard narrative sequences (stock stories); to the movement of a 
narrative through a state of disequilibrium to a final outcome that 
 
 
 21. Roland Barthes & Lionel Duisit, An Introduction to the Structural Analysis of Narrative, 6 
NEW LITERARY HIST. 237, 238 (1975) (footnote omitted). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Peter Brooks, Narrativity of the Law, 14 L. & LITERATURE 1, 1 (2002).  
 24. For a summary of the history of the field of law and literature, see Debora L. Threedy, The 
Madness of a Seduced Woman: Gender, Law, and Literature, 6 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 1 (1996). 
 25. Barthes & Duisit, supra note 21, at 238. Barthes and Duisit note that one of “structuralism’s 
main preoccupations” is to control 
the infinite variety of speech acts by attempting to describe the language or langue from 
which they originate, and from which they can be derived[.] Faced with an infinite number of 
narratives and the many standpoints from which they can be considered . . . the analyst is 
roughly in the same situation as Saussure, who was faced with desultory fragments of 
language, seeking to extract, from the apparent anarchy of messages, a classifying principle 
and a central vantage point for his description.Id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol6/iss2/6
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re-establishes order. Narratology also considers perspectives of 
telling: who sees and who tells; the explicit or implicit relation of 
the teller to what is told; the varying temporal modalities between 
the told and its telling.  
Most important, perhaps, narratology postulates a fundamental 
distinction between events in the world and the ways in which they 
are presented in a narrative discourse, demonstrating that 
storytelling always attempts to give some shape and significance to 
life.
26
 
Narrative recognizes a shared code between audience and author. Rather 
than approach literature through, say, aesthetics, narratology endeavors to 
comprehend how both the author and audience construct meaning out of a 
finite set of linguistic functions.
27
  
Barthes noted that since “narrative is made up solely of functions: 
everything, in one way or another, is significant. It is not so much a matter 
of art (on the part of the narrator) as it is a matter of structure.” 28 Thus, 
because narrative is finite, all things within narrative, even if they seem 
trivial (accessory to the development of the plot), are considered 
significant to the whole. This is an important concept to remember as we 
apply narratology to the law: because law reinforces the notion that the 
structuring of events within a finite space in which we tell a story, all 
details introduced in that story are integral to the narrative. Thus 
everything introduced in a trial is “relevant” to the story being told.  
It is crucial for the law to consider the power of narratives, especially 
“dominant” narratives. I use “dominant” to describe the narratives that are 
embedded in definitions of individual words. For example, the definition 
of the word “theft” can be conceived of in the abstract, but is generally 
defined and thought of through a narrative of events. Thus if certain 
narratives constitute our understanding of certain crimes, how can the law 
utilize narratology to counteract expectations and broaden the space 
available for victims?   
 
 
 26. Brooks, Narrative Transactions, supra note 5, at 24 (citations omitted). 
 27. See Rideout, supra note 1. See also DAVID RAY PAPKE, NARRATIVE AND THE LEGAL 
DISCOURSE: A READER IN STORYTELLING AND THE LAW (1991). 
 28. Barthes & Duisuit, supra note 21, at 244. 
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B. Why Use Narratology to Analyze the Law? 
Debate over if and how narratology should relate to the study of law is 
prevalent.
29
 Many legal scholars hold diametrically opposing beliefs as to 
how the study of narrative should factor into legal theory. This conflict 
may have to do with the law’s apprehension of being associated with a 
realm of thought that deals primarily with fictitious storytelling and not 
with actuality or truth. Unlike the law, literature makes no attempt to 
locate a standard of truth, nor to impart to its readers with a sense of 
certainty beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the intersection between the 
two fields is not without its tensions. Brooks has described the legal 
community’s apprehension with regard to narratology as a fear concerned 
with authenticity of narrative.
30
 Brooks writes: 
The legal storytelling movement has tended to valorize narrative as 
more authentic, concrete, and embodied than traditional legal 
syllogism. But as many of the contributors here point out, 
storytelling is a moral chameleon, capable of promoting the worse 
as well as the better cause every bit as much as legal sophistry. It 
can make no superior ethical claim. It is not, to be sure, morally 
neutral, for it always seeks to induce a point of view. Storytelling, 
one can conclude, is never innocent. If you listen with attention to a 
story well told, you are implicated by and in it.
31
 
Though many may view narrative’s capacity to act as a vehicle for 
storytelling as a positive quality and as a route of “dissent from traditional 
forms of legal reasoning and syllogism,” the study of narratives’ important 
message is that how you tell a story will invariably affect the imparting of 
meaning, and thus, truthfulness.
32
 As Catharine MacKinnon notes, the 
“ultimate risk of storytelling as method” is lying.33 While I make no 
 
 
 29. With regards to the question of whether narratology should be applied to the law, Peter 
Brooks has stated that “narratology—the analytic study of the phenomenon of narrativity and its 
various discursive manifestations—has developed some hypotheses, distinctions, and analytic methods 
that could be useful to legal scholars, if they were to pay attention.” Peter Brooks, The Law as 
Narrative and Rhetoric, in LAW’S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW 14, 17 (Peter 
Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996) [hereinafter Brooks, Law as Narrative]. For further reading on the 
debate over the proper role of narrative, see generally LAW’S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN 
THE LAW (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996). See also Brooks, Narrative Transactions, supra 
note 5; MacKinnon, Law’s Stories as Reality, supra note 19, at 232; Richard A. Posner, Legal 
Narratology, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 737 (1997). 
 30. See Brooks, Narrative Transactions, supra note 5.  
 31. Brooks, Law as Narrative, supra note 29, at 16. 
 32. Id. 
 33. MacKinnon, Law’s Stories as Reality, supra note 19, at 235. 
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claims to the capacity for veracity that narrative holds as compared to any 
other forms of discourse, I do believe that narratology offers a unique 
vantage point from which traditionally excluded “voices” or “stories” can 
find a foothold in a legal framework that might otherwise exclude them.  
Another issue underpinning the debate on whether and in what way the 
study of narrative should relate to the law is how narrative structures relate 
to epistemology. As Christopher Rideout notes, a fundamental inquiry 
underlying the study of narratology is whether narrative structures are 
merely forms of language that are “congruent with reality, or . . . some 
type of Kantian category, a structure of the mind that pre-exists and shapes 
our understanding of experience[.]”34 The central question in the literature 
surrounding the psychologically fundamental nature of narrative is 
whether narrative structures are “endogenous,” or inherent to the structure 
of the mind and/or language, or whether they are “exogenous” and thus 
“lie outside linguistic or psychological structures . . . .”35  
In coming to the conclusion that narratology can help us isolate 
narrative fidelity, Rideout draws on the work of Robert Burns.
36
 Burns 
emphasized the importance of narrative, arguing that it:   
[F]orms the deep structure of human action. In other words, the 
bedrock of human events is not a mere sequence upon which 
narrative is imposed but a configured sequence that has narrative 
character all the way down. To act at all is to hold an immediate 
past in memory, to anticipate a goal, and to organize means to 
achieve that goal—analogously, the “beginning, middle, and end” 
of a well-constructed story. Both action and storytelling are 
intrinsically chronological and logical . . . .
37
  
Rideout’s emphasis on distinguishing the epistemological foundation of 
narrative in human psychology may not be completely necessary for those 
who endeavor to use narratology as a lens to view the law. While this may 
be an important distinction generally, and especially to the nexus that 
exists between literature and psychology, whether narrative structure is 
innate or external may be unnecessary for the purposes of a narratological 
analysis of the law. At the utmost, this is a question of how we perceive 
and conceive of ideas, and what role narrative plays in that understanding. 
 
 
 34. Rideout, supra note 1, at 58. Rideout spends the first portion of his article summarizing the 
various theories regarding the epistemological underpinnings of narrative. 
 35. Id. 
 36. See generally id.  
 37. ROBERT P. BURNS, A THEORY OF THE TRIAL 222 (1999) (footnotes omitted). 
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On a more pragmatic level however, the epistemological distinction could 
be helpful, but not required, to use narratology to approach how jury bias 
and the structure of trials affect the outcome of cases.
38
  
Another much debated question surrounding the application of 
narratology is whether narratives inform law or vice versa. For example, 
Jonathan H. Grossman claims that “novels were shaped by the 
complementary and competing storytelling structure of law courts” 
through the “presentations of conflicting narratives . . . .”39 Still others 
argue that, particularly in our current media culture, literature has shaped 
how we approach the law, the implicit roles we expect the legal system to 
play, and our definitions of crime.
40
 Many conceive of this relationship as 
mutually informing, while others contend that the law strives to be 
hermetic from literature.
41
 Thus for many, the role the study of narrative 
should play in the law depends deeply on the answer to the question: 
which influences which—the law or narrative? 
Perhaps there are answers to these fundamental questions regarding the 
intersection of disciplines and the epistemology of narratives, but although 
I think it is important to acknowledge their existence, I do not believe that 
one theoretical formulation or the other would ever obviate the utility of a 
narratological analysis of the law. While the foundational philosophic 
questions may be how narrative operates within the mind and between 
disciplines, the question most applicable to the project of this paper is 
whether narratology, in its current form as an analytical tool, should be 
used to approach law.  
 
 
 38. See Paul Gewirtz, Narrative and Rhetoric in the Law, in LAW’S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND 
RHETORIC IN THE LAW 7, 9 (Peter Brooks & Paul Gewirtz eds., 1996). Gewirtz differentiates legal 
narratives from other forms of narrative in that the stakes are different for legal rhetoric. Gewirtz 
writes: 
The goal of storytelling in law is to persuade an official decisionmaker that one’s story is true, 
to win the case, and thus to invoke the coercive force of the state on one’s own behalf. . . . 
Robert Cover . . . was right to underscore that the words of court decisions have a force that 
differentiates them from most other utterances. However provocative and generative it may 
be treat law as literature, we must never forget that law is not literature. 
Id. at 5. 
 39. Deborah B. Luyster, English Law Courts and the Novel, 14 L. & LITERATURE 595, 595 
(2002) (citing arguments presented by Jonathan H. Grossman in THE ART OF ALIBI: ENGLISH LAW 
COURTS AND THE NOVEL (2002)). Luyster argues that Grossman’s understanding of narrativity in the 
law is somewhat flawed in that it “does not discuss the expectations accompanying all storytelling and 
the inherent risks of marshaling trial evidence into the framework of a story.” Id. at 596. 
 40. See Anthony Chase, Toward a Legal Theory of Popular Culture, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 527 
(1986); see also David Ray Papke, Conventional Wisdom: The Courtroom Trial in American Popular 
Culture, 82 MARQ. L. REV. 471 (1999).  
 41. See supra note 29. 
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Many scholars, including Peter Brooks, have argued that narratology is 
not only applicable but also crucial to the study of law.
42
 This contention is 
met with opposition, as others have argued that the two fields of study 
should remain wholly separate. For example, Alan Dershowitz considers 
narrative as a field in opposition to the aims of justice and claims that 
when we “import the narrative form of storytelling into our legal system, 
we confuse fiction with fact and endanger the truth-finding function of the 
adjudication process.”43  
Though the law may idealize itself as insular and may strive for 
complete autonomy from other disciplines, we should not forget that as 
long as human actors (whose thoughts and expectations are shaped by 
narratives) continue to involve themselves in the process of justice, 
complete isolation will remain a goal that the law will never be able to 
fully attain. This impossibility is especially true with regard to the legal 
system’s fundamental belief that adjudication should involve judgment by 
society through the mechanism of juries. People compose juries, and 
people are greatly influenced by the empathy evoked through storytelling. 
For example, in her article on victim impact statements, Erin Sheley draws 
from the famous study conducted by Pennington and Hastie that 
considered the “story model” inherent in trials and found that juries, when 
deciding upon the guilt or innocence of a defendant, make these 
decision by selecting the more appealing of the two narratives 
placed before them by the prosecution and the defense, rather than 
simply deciding whether the prosecution has in fact established 
individual elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
44
 
If such is the case, we cannot ignore narratives or narratology, even if we 
wish to banish both from the legal realm. Narrative is of fundamental 
importance to understanding the law. 
The Supreme Court has recognized narrative’s importance. In Old 
Chief v. United States, Justice Souter, writing for the majority regarding 
about the rules under which evidence can be admitted, wrote that 
 
 
 42. Brooks, Narrative Transactions, supra note 5, at 28. For the argument that the study of 
narrative has helped recognize the stories ignored by the legal system and “has been particularly 
attractive to those looking at how traditional legal discourse tends to silence the marginalized, such as 
women and minorities,” see Threedy, supra note 24, at 17. 
 43. Dershowitz, supra note 6, at 99, 101. 
 44. Erin Sheley, Reverberations of the Victim’s “Voice”: Victim Impact Statements and the 
Cultural Project of Punishment, 87 IND. L.J. 1247, 1258 (2012) (citing a study by Nancy Pennington 
and Reid Hastie found in INSIDE THE JUROR: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUROR DECISION MAKING 192 
(Reid Hastie ed., 1993)).  
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“persuasion needs evidentiary depth to tell a continuous story . . . .”45 The 
need for certain evidence to be included in trials is based in part on the 
need to tell a complete story: 
A syllogism is not a story, and a naked proposition in a courtroom 
may be no match for the robust evidence that would be used to 
prove it. People who hear a story interrupted by gaps of abstraction 
may be puzzled at the missing chapters, and jurors asked to rest a 
momentous decision on the story’s truth can feel put upon at being 
asked to take responsibility knowing that more could be said than 
they have heard. A convincing tale can be told with economy, but 
when economy becomes a break in the natural sequence of narrative 
evidence, an assurance that the missing link is really there is never 
more than second best.
46
  
Souter recognizes that narratives have their place in any trial and that 
“making a case with testimony and tangible things not only satisfies the 
formal definition of an offense, but tells a colorful story with descriptive 
richness.”47 This “descriptive richness” is desirable to any attorney or 
advocate because of its capacity to persuade a jury.
48
 
If storytelling is a mechanism by which we convince juries of veracity, 
then the stories themselves must be analyzed. Particularly, in the case of 
rape, how does our expectation of the narrative that constitutes “rape” 
shape the law, and how does that expectation affect persons whose stories 
do not fit within the narrative structure that is expected? Do rape shield 
laws enforce the stereotype of a certain type of victim? If so, does this 
open an even greater space for jury bias, since individual stories must 
conform to a preconceived narrative? 
II. HISTORY OF RAPE SHIELD LAWS 
Before these questions can be considered, a brief summary of rape 
shield laws should be addressed. Prior to the enactment of rape shield 
laws, a great discrepancy existed between how a rape victim deemed 
“chaste” was treated when compared to those who were deemed 
 
 
 45. Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 190 (1997). 
 46. Id. at 189. 
 47. Id. at 187. 
 48. Id. 
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“unchaste.”49 Lack of chastity  was used as an indicator that a woman had 
a propensity for dishonesty.
50
 Prior to enacting rape shield laws, 
questioning victims in an attempt to perform a “character assassination 
based on their sexual histories” was a perfectly accepted method of 
defense.
51
 Courts warned juries in these cases to exercise caution when 
examining a victim’s motive and credibility, and courts were allowed to 
examine the sexual history of the victim in extremely public detail.
52
  
Common law allowed defendants to cross-examine a rape victim about 
her sexual history, as well as testimony concerning the victim’s sexual 
reputation, including in some cases, testimony provided by prior sexual 
partners as witnesses.
53
 Thus at common law the veracity of certain 
narratives was attacked not by an analysis of the actions that actually 
comprised the narratives, but by dismantling the character of the narrator. 
By casting women into either chaste or unchaste roles, and using chastity 
as a proxy for honesty, common law made the narrative of rape accessible 
to only certain women that were able to conform to normative character 
expectations. While rape laws have attempted to shield women from a trial 
of their character when reporting rape, the laws have also shielded the 
character binaries that predicated the need for rape shield laws in the first 
place. 
Between the years 1960 and 1975 the number of reported rapes 
increased by 378%.
54
 Perhaps due to this dramatic increase in the 
incidence of reported rapes, during the mid-1970s Congress and state 
legislatures began to pass rape shield laws.
55
 Frank Tuerkheimer describes 
the justification for rape shield laws in the mid-1970s as fourfold. In 
enacting rape shield legislation, law-makers were attempting to address: 
(1) [T]he harassment and humiliation of the victim, (2) the 
exclusion of irrelevant evidence, (3) the need to keep the jury 
focused on relevant issues, and (4) the furtherance of effective law 
 
 
 49. Tuerkheimer, supra note 10, at 1462. “In the past, behavior deemed unchaste was thought to 
suggest a greater likelihood that a rape victim willingly engaged in sex with the defendant.” Id. 
(footnote omitted). 
 50. See Sakthi Murthy, Rejecting Unreasonable Sexual Expectations: Limits on Using a Rape 
Victim’s Sexual History to Show the Defendant’s Mistaken Belief in Consent, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 541 
(1991).  
 51. Id. at 550. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Hubert S. Feild, Rape Trial and Jurors’ Decisions: A Psycholegal Analysis of the Effects of 
Victim, Defendant, and Case Characteristics, 3 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 261 (1979) [hereinafter Feild, Rape 
Trial]. 
 55. Wallach, supra note 15, at 494. 
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enforcement by insuring that victims are not discouraged from 
cooperating with the police for fear of the trial.
56
 
The logic underpinning this Congressional initiative to address the 
problem of rape was eventually picked up and adopted by the individual 
states. 
All states have enacted their own rape shield laws and Federal Rule of 
Evidence 412 codified the rape shield on the federal level. Rule 412 
prohibits introducing a rape victim’s sexual history as reputation or 
opinion evidence at trial. Shawn Wallach describes this approach as 
having three major features: “(1) a general prohibition of any evidence 
regarding a victim’s past sexual conduct; (2) several exceptions allowing 
evidence considered relevant; and (3) a ‘catch-all’ provision authorizing 
the trial court to review any sexual behavior evidence for which there is no 
exception.”57  
The exceptions included in Rule 412 are also three-fold.
58
 The first 
exception allows the defendant to introduce evidence that the victim has 
had sexual encounters with persons other than the defendant, but only if 
that evidence is used in order to indicate that the defendant was not the 
source of semen or injury. The second exception allows past sexual 
behavior of the victim with the defendant himself to be introduced, “if 
offered by the defendant to prove consent, or if offered by the 
prosecutor.”59 The third exception permits a defendant in a rape case to 
introduce the evidence that he has the constitutional right to introduce. A 
final possible exception, although never expressly stated within the law, is 
that of mistake.
60
 The concept of mistake relies heavily on narrative in that 
mistake can be argued when “[t]he victim was reputed to be sexually 
experienced; the defendant knew of this reputation; sexually experienced 
 
 
 56. Frank Tuerkheimer, A Reassessment and Redefinition of Rape Shield Laws, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1245, 1250–51 (1989) (citations omitted). 
 57. Wallach, supra note 15, at 495 (citations omitted). 
 58. FED. R. EVID. 412. 
 59. The Rule states that “evidence of specific instances of a victim’s sexual behavior with respect 
to the person accused of the sexual misconduct, if offered by the defendant to prove consent or if 
offered by the prosecutor” is admissible. Id. This exception is extremely problematic given that of the 
women raped in the United States, “half are raped by their intimate partner, and forty percent by an 
acquaintance.” Deborah Tuerkheimer, Slutwalking in the Shadow of the Law, 98 MINN. L. REV. 1453, 
1453 (2014) (citing the findings in CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, THE NATIONAL 
INTIMATE PARTNERS AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY (NISVS): 2010 SUMMARY REPORT 18 (2011)). 
This figure indicates that half of the women raped in the United States cannot be protected by the rape 
shield law because they have had prior sexual contact with their rapist, and therefore their prior sexual 
history with that person will be admissible at trial. 
 60. For an explanation of this unstated exception, see Murthy, supra note 50.  
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women are widely seen as being more likely to consent in a given 
situation; thus, the defendant thought the victim was sexually available 
although she did not explicitly indicate consent.”61 Thus the defense of 
mistake preserves an avenue of inquiry that rape shield laws were 
designed to prevent.  
These exceptions have caused many to argue that the rape shield laws 
are ineffective at blocking prior sexual history from finding its way into 
trials and inappropriately influencing the jury.
62
 Generally, the argument 
aimed at rape shield laws is that “history evidence” is admitted “when the 
complainant has been intimate with the defendant before, when the 
defendant claims that he held a reasonable but mistaken belief as to her 
consent, or when the complainant has previously engaged in a pattern of 
sexual conduct, prostitution, or other promiscuity,” which essentially 
opens the door to sexual history evidence in most cases of acquaintance 
rape.
63
 Given the prevalence of acquaintance rapes occurring in the United 
States, it is not difficult to conclude that rape shield laws are inadequate 
because they are limited to protect a victim of a certain type of rape.
64
 
While rape shield laws have been an effective means of alleviating 
some of the scrutiny common law applied to victims of rape, it is 
undeniable that much that the rape shield laws attempt to prevent persists 
within the legal system. For example, the Model Penal Code has preserved 
the scrutiny that prevailed at common law regarding rape trials. With 
regards to rape cases, the Model Penal Code recommends the following 
jury instruction:  
In any prosecution before a jury for [a sexual offense], the jury shall 
be instructed to evaluate the testimony of a victim or complaining 
witness with special care in view of the emotional involvement of 
the witness and the difficulty of determining the truth with respect 
to alleged sexual activities carried out in private.
65
 
The Model Penal Code does not apply this type of caution to any other 
crime.
66
 Yet many legal theorists, after recognizing the flaws in rape shield 
 
 
 61. Id. at 557 (citation omitted). 
 62. See Tuerkheimer, Reassessment, supra note 56; Murthy, supra note 50; Heather D. Flowe et 
al., Rape Shield Laws and Sexual Behavior Evidence: Effects of Consent Level and Women’s Sexual 
History on Rape Allegations, 31 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 159 (2007). For the view that rape shield laws are 
too pervasive and unfair to defendants, see Wallach, supra note 15. 
 63. Anderson, Sexual Consent, supra note 9, at 1.  
 64. Supra note 59. 
 65. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(5). 
 66. Anderson, Negative Social Attitudes, supra note 16, at 649.  
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laws, contend that the solution to the problem lies in strengthening and 
expanding the scope of these laws.  
Rather than attempting to block information from being admissible, we 
should abandon the rape shield laws altogether and attempt a new model. 
While I believe that rape shield laws were a crucial step towards justice at 
a time of incredibly unjust law regarding rape, it is time to move forward 
and recognize that prior sexual history should not be shielded because of 
privacy, but because it is irrelevant to the inquiry. The Advisory 
Committee that adopted Rule 412 issued the following statement: “[t]he 
rule aims to safeguard the alleged victim against the invasion of privacy, 
potential embarrassment and sexual stereotyping that is associated with 
public disclosure of intimate sexual details and the infusion of sexual 
innuendo from the fact-finding process.”67 This type of thinking moved 
the law away from the belief that an inquiry into a woman’s sexual history 
was appropriate during rape cases. But it did not open space for rape to be 
considered outside of the stereotypical narrative. Rule 412 did not 
introduce the concept of consent as the relevant inquiry, nor did it dismiss 
past sexual experiences as irrelevant. 
Thus I find that the current rape shield laws are not only ineffective, 
but also are counterproductive in that they conceptualize rape as an 
occurrence that can only be described through a single narrative involving 
certain character norms. This narrative limits rape victims to a framework 
where success will be measured against the backdrop of a social belief that 
only certain types of women can be raped.  
III. NARRATIVES OF RAPE 
Studies have shown that “the success of rape prosecutions often 
depends on how closely an alleged rape hews to certain accepted rape 
narratives.”68 The stereotypical rape narrative generally envisions a 
“young woman who is walking home alone at night” when suddenly she is 
approached by a man who “drags her into an alley” and, following a 
beating where the woman struggles for her life until the man threatens to 
kill her, the woman is raped and afterwards “she immediately calls the 
police to report the offense.”69 As Anderson notes, “[d]espite generations 
of repeated storytelling, this type of rape is, in terms of actual incidence, a 
 
 
 67. FED. R. EVID. 412. Advisory Note. 
 68. Bennett Capers, Real Women, Real Rape, 60 UCLA L. REV. 826, 831–32 (2013).  
 69. This “archetypal narrative” as opposed to the acquaintance rape narrative is described by 
Anderson at length. See Anderson, Negative Social Attitudes, supra note 16, at 645. 
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statistical outlier . . . .”70 And even though it is by far the more prevalent 
occurrence, rape by an acquaintance plays no part in this stereotypical 
story. Why then does this narrative persist within the law? Narratology is 
well suited to answer this question. 
Narratology recognizes that narratives exist beyond individual 
descriptions of characters, beyond the intention of authors, and beyond 
particular stories themselves. Barthes contended that “participation in a 
sphere of actions” defined characters, while the sphere of actions itself 
belonged to the structure of the narrative.
71
 This pattern of action—the 
composition of which makes the narrative—not the details that forge a 
particular story, is what persists. Those who engage in the study of 
narratives tend to consider characters as secondary to the narrative itself.
72
 
Some scholars have even gone so far as to say that a plot of a story can 
become so entrenched in our understanding that the linear progression of 
events can exist without any character development at all.
73
 
Furthermore, narratology recognizes that the author can (and, it is often 
argued, should) be completely removed from the audience’s perception of 
the text.
74
 In this way, we can understand narratives as having shaped us to 
expect certain actions to take place in stories regardless of the individual 
descriptions of the character or the variation of author. Thus, perhaps our 
understanding of the word “rape” is entrenched in a narrative so 
fundamentally dependent on a certain set of actions, that even when 
acquaintance rape becomes the predominant reality in society, we 
persistently cling to an understanding of what constitutes “rape” as the 
more traditional narrative. 
What space does that leave for individual story-telling in rape trials? 
When testifying, a rape victim navigates both the realm of narrator and 
character in a story. If there is dissonance between the expected narrative 
and the story as portrayed, then a jury is less likely to believe the 
allegations. In a recent study, it was shown that “[w]omen were less likely 
to say that they would take legal action in response to . . . rape scenarios if 
 
 
 70. Id. 
 71. Barthes & Duisit, supra note 21, at 258. 
 72. Id. at 260. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 261. Barthes and Duisit write: 
Now, at least from our viewpoint, both narrator and characters are essentially “paper beings.” 
The living author of a narrative can in no way be mistaken for the narrator of that narrative 
. . . . The one who speaks (in the narrative) is not the one who writes (in real life) and the one 
who writes is not the one who is. 
Id. 
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they had extensive sexual histories, or if they had consented to an 
extensive amount of intimate contact before the rape.”75 Thus, as a 
narrator, the victim must attempt to bring her story and the portrayal of her 
character to conform with an archetype in order to succeed at trial. 
Breaking from the expected story model—where the characters are 
interchangeable and the events are always the same—is dangerous, 
because it deprives the audience (the jury) of an archetypal story they 
believe evokes guilt. The negative effects of having a dissonant and 
individualized portrayal of the author and narrator in the face of the 
expected archetypal sequence of events that comprises a story is clearly 
evidenced in the studies of jury bias in the context of rape cases. 
IV. JURY BIAS AND NARRATOLOGY 
At the crux of the nexus between narrative structures and trials is the 
understanding of the jury as an audience. Because the jury functions to 
determine whether a story is “true beyond a reasonable doubt” for the 
purposes of law, jurors are unlike a body that reads literature purely for 
intellectual enjoyment or entertainment.
76
 Although one’s first reaction 
might be to think that juries should be an easier audience to convince 
because they are individually selected by counsel to listen to the stories of 
the parties, this does not seem to be able to overcome the power that the 
traditional rape narrative holds over social thought. For example, in a 
study on jury decisions in rape trials, Sally Ellis Mathiasen noted that 
“traditional moral and social attitudes about rape and rape victims, from 
which the law developed and which it reinforces, are brought to bear on 
the believability of the victim.”77 What is interesting to note is Mathiasen’s 
consideration that the law not only develops but also reinforces social 
attitudes. Such an understanding supports the contention that rape shield 
laws reinforce an archetypal narrative that is no longer a reality for most 
rape victims, and as such, should be reevaluated. 
Further, from a variety of studies of juries, it appears that juries’ 
narrative expectations in rape cases are generally consistent with 
traditional social mores and a shared societal understanding of what linear 
story constitutes rape.
78
 In fact, the pattern of events that juries expect to 
 
 
 75. Flowe et al., supra note 62, at 159. 
 76. DRESSLER, supra note 2, at 1. 
 77. Hubert S. Feild, Juror Background Characteristics and Attitudes toward Rape: Correlates of 
Jurors’ Decisions in Rape Trials, 2 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 73, 76 (1978) (citing a study by Mathiasen) 
[hereinafter Feild, Juror Background].  
 78. See Feild, Rape Trial, supra note 54; Hubert Feild, Juror Background, supra note 77.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol6/iss2/6
  
 
 
 
 
2014] CONFINED TO A NARRATIVE 415 
 
 
 
 
hear when adjudicating a rape case are so well recognized that certain non-
traditional narratives are often foreclosed from ever making it into the trial 
setting because of the discretion of the prosecuting attorney.
79
  In her 
analysis of various empirical studies of rape prosecution, Amanda Konradi 
concludes that “that, under pressure to conserve institutional resources, 
legal personnel rely on stereotypes in making decisions to prosecute rape 
and that a persistent bias remains against women whose rape experiences 
do not conform to the classic stranger stereotype.”80  
Hence, prior to even getting their stories to the courtroom, victims’ 
narratives are selected on the basis of their likelihood to be believed by 
hypothetical juries. The probability of obtaining success at trial is 
measured by how closely each victim’s story conforms to the anticipated 
jury’s archetype-based expectations. If the story does not conform to the 
expected narrative, the victim is unlikely to ever achieve getting her day in 
court. Furthermore, even if the victim does get to trial, it is less likely that 
a jury will find her non-archetypal narration of events as compelling as a 
story that conforms to the archetypal/socially-expected narrative model.  
Even for the narratives that make it past the “weeding out” stage of the 
criminal process, victims that go to court must attempt, through the 
performance of appearance and story-telling, to “characterize” themselves 
to fit expected stereotypes to better their chances of success.
81
 Konradi 
notes that prosecutors advise rape survivors taking the stand that they must 
dress in ways that conform to the normative visual standards separating 
real victims from women “who asked for it.”82 This need to conform to a 
stereotypical and expected image is predicated on the fact that studies have 
shown that jurors are greatly influenced by their perception of a victim’s 
“character.”83  
Rape victims were also coached in “emotion work” so that through 
rehearsal they could deliver their testimony and utilize their body language 
to evoke certain sympathetic emotions within the jury.
84
 While this paper 
does not endeavor to address the performative functioning of narratives, 
this prosecutorial strategy demonstrates an interesting nexus between 
narrative and performance. While preparing a witness for trial does not 
seem at all insidious, coaching a witness to align her performance to a 
 
 
 79. See Feild, Juror Background, supra note 77, at 90. 
 80. Amanda Konradi, Preparing to Testify: Rape Survivors Negotiating the Criminal Justice 
Process, 10 GENDER & SOC’Y 404, 406 (1996). 
 81. Id.  
 82. Id. at 411. 
 83. Id. at 411–12. 
 84. Id. at 415. 
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particular model certainly emphasizes the idea that only one story is 
believable in the courtroom. If rape victims are foreclosed from the 
courtroom because their experiences do not match an archetypal 
expectation and those who make it to trial are coached to conform to these 
expectations, there is little room left for the recounting of individual 
experience. The space in which to narrate the reality of personal 
experience is thus extremely limited if the narrative is to succeed at trial. I 
believe that a consent-based framework could address this problem.  
V. CONSIDERING A CONSENT-BASED FRAMEWORK 
If juries as audiences are prone to only find the “truth” in a society-
accepted archetypal narratives, and the law reinforces those narratives, the 
question remains: How do we create the needed space for victims whose 
narratives do not fit the expected paradigm? I suggest a two-part model: 
one that first introduces a consent-based
85
 definition of rape and then, 
second, supports this concept with jury instructions.
86
 If rape shield laws 
were abolished and in their place a consent framework was adopted, the 
law would necessarily have to consider individual narratives rather than 
make individuals force their characters and narratives into compliance 
with a single narrative model to succeed in the courtroom. 
A. The Legal Nature of Consent 
In this model, the first question that must be addressed is—what is 
consent? Consent necessarily requires that we consider the epistemology 
of the “self” and how that “self” can acquiesce to certain events prior to 
their happening. Pragmatically, in a consent-based framework, I would 
have the law consider consent to be a fixed event. Yet many scholars hold 
that consent falls outside of the context of simply a discrete event. For 
example, Judith Butler’s understanding of consent derives from an 
understanding of the self as something that is not immutable and instead is 
constantly shifting—even in its retrospective understanding of past 
 
 
 85. This idea is not aligned with an understanding of consent as a non-static entity that cannot be 
isolated. See Judith Butler, Sexual Consent: Some Thoughts on Psychoanalysis and Law 21.2 COLUM. 
J. GENDER & L. 3 (2012).  
 86. Capers, supra note 68, at 862, 872–75. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol6/iss2/6
  
 
 
 
 
2014] CONFINED TO A NARRATIVE 417 
 
 
 
 
events.
87
 This indeterminate concept would be a nearly impossible 
definition of consent for the law to apply. Butler asks: 
Although consent is often conceived as a discrete act that an 
individual performs and so draws upon the presumption of a stable 
individual, what happens to this framework if we maintain the view 
that the “I” who consents does not necessarily stay the same in the 
course of its consent? In other words, does the “I” give itself over to 
a certain transformation, not fully knowable in advance, through its 
act of consent? And if consent is given to another, or before 
another, it is then a way of organizing a social relation rather than a 
merely individual act? Moreover, if the “I” enters into a social 
relationship by virtue of its consent, is it also sometimes 
transformed precisely by what happens by virtue of its consent? 
How do we explain the fact that sometimes the “I” who consents 
undergoes a change in the course of its consenting?
88
 
While I agree that, in terms of the psychology of the self, consent may not 
be a truly discrete act because the self is never truly stable, I find that 
following this line of thought would not in any way help the law’s 
endeavor to ensure justice in the realm of human actions. The law has to 
posit some intentions and mens rea elements as fixed, or else it could not 
function. 
Thus while I agree that no human experience predicated on the relation 
between a person’s internal thoughts and external actions can be truly 
understood independently and out of context of time, experience, and 
social influence, I cannot see how this definition could or why it should be 
applied to the law. Yet perhaps the legal system could utilize the concept 
of relation that consent implies. Butler argues that consent is not “a 
singular act of a subject” and that instead consent is  
more or less [an] organized way of entering into relationship. There 
always seems to be someone else, or some other set of persons to 
whom one gives consent, or before him consent is offered. Of 
course, our ordinary language suggests that we consent to entering 
relationships, and sometimes that is, in fact, the case. But following 
from a consideration of consent within a broadly “relational” 
framework, we might ask whether consent needs to be redescribed 
in such a way that it both presupposes and orchestrates some 
 
 
 87. Butler, supra note 85, at 4. 
 88. Id. 
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relation to another. Is there always someone else there for consent 
to be possible, someone to whom or before whom I consent, and in 
what sense can we see this “act” as a relational and social form?89  
This focus on relation is an excellent inquiry for law. The law should 
recognize consent as an isolated occasion. Yet understanding consent as a 
relationship could provide an avenue to approaching accusations of rape—
and codifying consent as the inquiry for rape would open up space for 
those whose stories are silenced by the trial system because of the 
predominance of a single narratological understanding of rape. 
I would propose defining consent statutorily in the negative. If consent 
were so defined, the inquiry into whether a rape had occurred would hinge 
on whether consent was not given—essentially whether someone 
expressed “no.”  The major difficulties with this system would be when 
there was no verbal consent or lack of consent—namely when there is 
silence or implied consent.
 90
 Yet I think the law could be tailored to 
address these issues. For example if consent was not expressly given or 
denied, a totality of the circumstances test (only taking into account 
contextual history between plaintiff and defendant) could be used to 
determine if a reasonable person would have thought consent had been 
granted. In the “classic” cases of stranger rape, consent would be almost a 
non-issue, and the current rape laws could be applied to those situations.
91
  
A consent-based structure would not need to operate like a rape shield 
in that the consent-based structure would block evidence of past 
experiences because a consent-based definition of rape would inherently 
foreclose much evidence of past experiences as irrelevant since the basic 
 
 
 89. Id.  
 90. Silence is an issue in any consent based framework but law could allow for a fairly large 
gradation in sentencing to account for the “grey area” that silence creates within this legal inquiry. See 
Oberman, supra note 18. Oberman acknowledges that a person’s “passivity” once someone initiates 
physical contact does not necessarily indicate consent. Id. at 728. Citing multiple psychological 
studies, Oberman discusses the problem of silence in the context of consent because during an 
unwanted physical encounter it is “quite possible for women to ‘freeze’ out of fear.” Id. Indeed, in one 
study of acquaintance rape, author Eugene Kanin identified five cases in which the women were 
“actually immobilized with fear,” and therefore could not even communicate their nonconsent. For a 
study of the psychological “freezing” effect of rape victims, see Eugene Kanin, Date Rape: Unofficial 
Criminals and Victims, 9 VICTIMOLOGY 95, 97 (1984). While silence is problematic in a consent based 
system, my argument here is that once the word “no” or nonconsent is recognized as the inquiry for 
whether rape has occurred, and perhaps persons who are subject to unwanted physical contact will be 
empowered to communicate their nonconsent.  
 91. This suggests a bifurcated model—one where acquaintance rape and stranger rape are dealt 
with differently. Since the current laws seem to adequately address non-acquaintance rape, the model I 
suggest could be readily applied to cases of acquaintance rape, leaving the current instructions intact 
for cases of stranger rape. 
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inquiry would center on an isolated set of events and the relationship 
between the parties in question. And while context may be needed to 
frame different events, this context should be limited to situations 
involving both the plaintiff and defendant.  
B. Jury Instructions 
Jury instructions would be a useful mechanism to counter the 
subconsciously entrenched archetypal story model of rape. In a consent-
based framework, jury instructions need only act as a reminder that the 
proper inquiry of rape is consent—and that this is a legal “event” that 
should be considered both in the abstract and in context. For example, in 
his article on rape shield laws, Bennett Capers suggests an instruction that 
among other things would relate to jurors that “[e]ngaging in sexual 
behavior, whether it be once or innumerable times, does not render a 
person outside of the law’s protection.”92 Something similar could be 
worded to reinforce the consent-based inquiry.  
This instruction would need to reaffirm that rape cases should be 
considered on a consent-based model and inquiry. It would also be prudent 
to include in this instruction some mention of the fact that if consent is 
expressly denied, that denial is enough to constitute rape. In this way the 
jury would be reminded prior to deliberation that the model that should 
frame its analysis of the facts is not the archetypal rape scenario, but rather 
whether consent was given in this individual set of circumstances. This 
refocusing may not completely curb the effects of expected narratives, but 
would be a starting point at the very least. In this way, the laws regarding 
rape would allow for a change in the narrative space available to victims. 
A focus on consent would allow for the articulation of individual 
experience.  
 
 
 92. Capers, supra note 68, at 872. Capers’ suggested jury instruction reads: 
Everyone deserves to have the criminal law vindicate them when they have been raped, 
regardless of their sexual history. Engaging in sexual behavior, whether it be once or 
innumerable times, does not render a person outside of the law’s protection. Everyone is 
entitled to sexual autonomy, and no one, by merely engaging in sex, assumes the risk of 
subsequent rape. Put differently, before the law, it does not matter whether a complainant is a 
virgin or sexually active. Before the law, everyone is entitled to legal respect, regardless of 
his or her sexual past. Accordingly, bear in mind that in this case and in all rape cases, all rape 
victims are entitled to the law’s protection. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
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CONCLUSION 
Rape shield laws played an important function by protecting victims 
from unfair prying by the defense into their past sexual history in an effort 
to devalue their account of events. Yet that shield, though well intended, 
when approached through narratology, may be understood now as 
reaffirming an archetypal story of rape that does violence to those victims 
whose stories do not align with the stereotypical narrative. The protection 
that rape shield laws offer needs to be reconfigured into a consent 
framework and reinforced by jury instruction. By making the inquiry rest 
on consent, the law would afford victims the opportunity to provide their 
own narratives, rather than obligate them to attempt to conform their 
stories and character to a separate “believable” account of events.  
Many scholars have criticized rape shield laws. Yet very little has been 
said on the subject of narratology and rape law. Legal narratology allows 
us to question how stories are told, and if there is justice in those tellings. 
By approaching rape law through narratology, we begin to see the 
injustice of the current system. The law endorses a structure where truth 
beyond a reasonable doubt can be located, yet in the cases of rape, the 
victims must conform their “real” experiences to a dominant and fictitious 
narrative in order to be believed. This is a narrative problem the law must 
endeavor to address. Through narratology, it becomes apparent that a new 
model needs to be established. This model would not only subsume the 
protection that rape shields were created to provide, but would also open 
up space so that individual narratives can succeed in the courtroom, 
thereby creating a framework that offers respect and justice to victims of 
rape. 
 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_jurisprudence/vol6/iss2/6
